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Shareholder's Personal Claim
THE SHAREHOLDER'S PERSONAL CLAIM
Allowing Recovery for Reflective Losses
An absolute application of the no reflective loss principle can
result in unfairness. As such, retaining judicial discretion in
the area will do much to ensure that genuine causes are not
denied remedy. However, even as our courts appear prepared
to allow a shareholder to recover for reflective loss, it is
important that corporate autonomy is accorded due respect,
and not be obscured by an over-consideration of policy
concerns. To ensure this, the courts should allow recovery
only if the right asserted by the shareholder is one that is
separate and independent of the company's right.
Pearlie KOH
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (University ofMelbourne);
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);
Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.
I. Introduction
1 The rule in Foss v Harbottle decrees that where a wrong is done
to a company, only the company may sue for any damage caused to it.
This does not mean that the shareholders of the company do not suffer
any loss, for any negative impact the wrongdoing may have on the
company is likely to also affect the value of its assets, and hence the
value of the shares of the company. It is, however, clear that the
shareholders do not, by reason of that loss alone, acquire any direct
cause of action against the wrongdoer.2 As the cause of action belongs to
the company, it is only right that the company alone is entitled to
prosecute in respect of that wrong. This is a necessary corollary of the
separate legal status of the company.
2 What then if the shareholder is able to establish a personal cause
of action against the same wrongdoer? Is he entitled to recover all losses
he suffered as a consequence of the wrong against him? The answer
appears settled in England by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore
1 (1843) 2 Hare 461. See also Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064; Heng Mui
Pheow v Tan Ting Koon [ 1989] 1 SLR(R) 670; Ng Heng Liat v Kiyue Co Ltd [2003]
4 SLR(R) 218.
2 See also Companies Act 1993 (New Zealand) s 169(2) which specifically recognises
this.
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Wood & Co' ("Johnson"), which made it clear that where the loss suffered
by the shareholder "merely reflected the diminution of the company's
assets"' the shareholder is debarred from claiming such loss. This rule,
in the words of Lord Millett, is "a matter of principle; there is no
discretion involved".* If the loss is reflective, the shareholder cannot
recover. Reflective losses cover not only loss manifested in the
diminution of share value, but extends to all payments6 which the
company would have made to the shareholder had it not been deprived
of its funds by the alleged wrong. The rule applies even if the claim
made by the shareholder is in some other capacity apart from his
capacity as shareholder. The shareholder's claim, whether qua employee
or qua creditor, is therefore similarly debarred.
3 The Court of Appeal in Singapore had the occasion to comment
on the no reflective loss principle in Townsing v Jenton Overseas
Investment Pte Ltd.' Whilst the court overtly adopted' the no reflective
loss principle as established by the English decisions of, inter alia,
Johnson and Gardner v Parker,9 it is apparent nonetheless that the Court
of Appeal was prepared to accept a somewhat less rigid stance vis-a-vis
the principle."o Specifically, the court was prepared to allow a plaintiff to
adduce evidence or to take steps to disapply the no reflective loss
principle by showing that there was no possibility or risk of double
recovery.
4 In this article, it is argued that the Singapore Court of Appeal is,
with respect, correct to eschew the rigid approach. A rigid rule, as Peter
Gibson LJ observed in Shaker v Al-Bedrawi,11 can "work hardship".
Although an absolute approach does engender predictability and hence
efficiency,1 it can in some circumstances be at the expense of fairness
and justice. As Chao Hick Tin JA opined in Chwee Kin Keong v
Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd,13 "[w]hile certainty is desirable, it is not an
3 [2002] 2 AC 1. See generally C Mitchell, "Shareholders' Claims for Reflective
Loss" (2004) 120 LQR 457; J Mukwiri, "The No Reflective Loss Principle" (2005)
26 Company Lawyer 304; J Lee, "Barring Recovery for Diminution in Value of
Shares on the Reflective Loss Principle" (2007) 66 CLJ 537.
4 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 66, per Lord Millet.
5 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 62.
6 Including dividends, pension scheme contributions and also any repayment of
debt: see Gardner v Parker [2004] 2 BCLC 554.
7 [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597.
8 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [77].
9 [2004] 1 BCLC 417.
10 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [86].
11 [2003] Ch 350 at [86].
12 E Ferran, "Litigation by Shareholders and Reflective Loss" (2001) 60 CLJ 245
at 247.
13 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 502 at [81].
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object which should prevail in all circumstances, even against the
dictates of justice".
5 However, it would be too simplistic an approach for the court to
exercise its discretion to disapply the rule whenever the policy reasons
that sustain it are not in issue. Adopting such an approach risks
compromising the integrity of the company's separate legal status by
according insufficient respect to the distinction between corporate (and
hence derivative) and direct personal rights. If the losses claimed by the
shareholder are presumptively reflective, before considering the policy
concerns, the court should first satisfy itself that the shareholder's claim
against the defendant can be properly classified, and therefore should be
classified, as a personal claim. Only then should the court proceed to
consider whether the policy concerns that support the rule may be
adequately dealt with in the particular case. It is this author's view that
adopting this approach will be in keeping with Lord Bingham's
exhortation in Johnson for the court "to be astute to ensure that
the party who has in fact suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied
compensation" 14 [emphasis added].
6 We begin by considering the no reflective loss principle as
developed by the English courts and the policy concerns that sustain it.
II. The non-recovery of "reflective" loss
7 The rule barring a shareholder's personal action to recover a
reduction in the value of his shares applies only when there are
overlapping claims by both the company and the shareholder against the
same defendant. The genesis of this no reflective loss principle may be
traced to the English Court of Appeal decision in Prudential Assurance
Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2)" ("Prudential Assurance"). The
plaintiff, an institutional investor which held approximately 3% of the
shares in Newman, a public quoted company, claimed against two
directors of Newman both derivatively and personally. The claims were
in respect of Newman's purchase of certain assets at an overvalue which
was allegedly procured by the directors fraudulently. The personal claim,
brought in the plaintiff's capacity as shareholder, was premised on the
misleading advice given to the shareholders by the directors in order to
procure general meeting approval of the purchase as was required by
stock exchange rules.
14 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 36.
15 [1982] Ch 204.
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8 Overruling the lower court,1 6 the Court of Appeal held that
the personal claim against the directors was misconceived. Whilst
recognising that the directors owed the shareholders a duty, when
advising them to approve the transaction, to give such advice in good
faith and not fraudulently, and which duty may have been breached, the
plaintiff nevertheless could not succeed in its personal claim as it had
not suffered any personal loss. The court said:"
[The shareholder] cannot ... recover damages merely because the
company in which he is interested has suffered damage. He cannot
recover a sum equal to the diminution in the market value of his
shares, or equal to the likely diminution in dividend, because such a
'loss' is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company.
9 This view of the nature of the shareholder's "loss" has been
criticised as "indefensibly narrow". Indeed, whilst it is a basic principle
of company law that ownership of a share in a company gives the
shareholder no interest as such in the assets of the company,19 conferring
on the shareholder only certain participation rights in connection with
those assets whilst the company is a going concern and a pro rata
interest in the net assets of the company upon its liquidation,2 0 it is
nevertheless incontrovertible that shares are items of property21
belonging to the shareholder and to which a real monetary value may be
ascribed.2 Accordingly, although a shareholder can have no insurable
interest in the assets of the company,23 he certainly does have an
16 Vinelott J accepted that as the alleged fraud committed against the company had
resulted in the company paying more for the assets acquired, this would have
resulted in a reduction in profit or net earnings, which must, in turn, have affected
the prices at which the shares of the company changed hands. This, Vinelott J,
accepted, was loss suffered by the shareholders: see Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] Ch 257 at 302-303.
17 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204
at 222-223.
18 C Mitchell, "Shareholders' Claims for Reflective Loss" (2004) 120 LQR 457 at 459.
See also M J Sterling, "The Theory and Policy of Shareholder Actions in Tort"
(1987) 50 MLR 468 at 470-471.
19 As Evershed LJ observed in Shorty Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 at 122:
"Shareholders are not, in the eye of the law, part owners of the undertaking. The
undertaking is something different from the totality of the share -holdings."
20 See, eg, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204
at 223; Peters' American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457 at 503-504:
"Primarily a share in a company is a piece of property conferring rights in relation
to distributions of income and of capital."
21 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 61-62; Peters' American Delicacy Co
Ltd v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457. See also Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed)
s 121: "The shares or other interest of any member in a company shall be movable
property, transferable in the manner provided by the articles, and shall not be of
the nature of immovable property."
22 On valuation of shares, see, eg, Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116,
affirmed [1948] AC 534.
23 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co [ 1925] AC 619.
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insurable interest in the value of his shares in the company.2 Necessarily,
therefore, when the value of the shares decline, this is a real loss suffered
by the shareholder personally. This was recognised and accepted by the
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Christensen v Scott,5 where Thomas J
opined as follows:26
The fact that the loss may also be suffered by the company does not
mean that it is not also a personal loss to the [shareholder]. Indeed,
the diminution in the value of [the claimants'] shares in the company
is by definition a personal loss and not a corporate loss.
10 Contrary to the view of the court in Prudential Assurance,
Lord Millett accepted,2 in Johnson, as did Lord Hutton,2 that a
diminution of share value is a personal loss for the shareholder. But this,
as Lord Millet said, is not the point:2
The point is that [the loss] merely reflected the diminution of the
company's assets. The test is not whether the company could have
made a claim in respect of the loss in question; the question is
whether, treating the company and the shareholder as one for this
purpose, the shareholder's loss is franked by that of the company. If so,
such reflected loss is recoverable by the company and not by the
shareholders.
11 As pointed out earlier, the concept of reflective loss to which
the bar applies extends beyond the diminution of share value.
Lord Bingham in Johnson stated that where the loss claimed "would be
made good if the company had enforced its full rights against the party
responsible","o that loss would be merely a reflection of the loss suffered
by the company. This would clearly include such other payments which
the company would have made to the plaintiff, whether or not qua
shareholder, if it had not been deprived of its funds by the defendant's
wrongdoing." For example, in Johnson, the House of Lords struck out
claims for lost salary and pension contributions, which the shareholder
had sustained in his capacity as employee. And, in Gardner v Parker,32
24 Wilson v Jones (1867) LR 2 Exch 139. See also M J Sterling, "The Theory and Policy
of Shareholder Actions in Tort" (1987) 50 MLR 468 at 472.
25 [1996] 1 NZLR 273.
26 Christensen v Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273 at 280.
27 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 66.
28 Lord Hutton thought that it was a "more realistic assessment" that the loss suffered
by a shareholder through the diminution in the value of his shareholding is a
personal loss: Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 54.
29 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 66.
30 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 36.
31 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 67.
32 [2004] 2 BCLC 554.
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a shareholder's claim as creditor for the loss of its ability to recover on a
loan made to the company was similarly held barred by the principle.
12 If "reflective losses" are by definition personal losses suffered by
the shareholder, why then should the shareholder not be entitled to
recover for that loss? The non-recovery is dictated on policy grounds.
Lord Millett alluded to these when he stated as follows:3 4
If the shareholder is allowed to recover in respect of such loss, then
either there will be double recovery at the expense of the defendant or
the shareholder will recover at the expense of the company and its
creditors and other shareholders. Neither course can be permitted.
This is a matter of principle; there is no discretion involved. Justice to
the defendant requires the exclusion of one claim or the other;
protection of the interests of the company's creditors requires that it
is the company which is allowed to recover to the exclusion of the
shareholder.
13 The first major reason thus resides in the court's concern with
preventing double recovery by the plaintiff shareholder. A closely related
concern is that the defendant should be protected from being exposed
to multiple actions in respect of the same acts.> However, as many have
already observed, there is little inherently objectionable about allowing
double recovery against a defendant who had assumed separate
responsibilities to different parties.36 And even if "justice to the
defendant" requires that the shareholder does not recover twice over,
there are a number of ways in which this may be achieved. In
Christensen v Scott, Thomas J noted the possibility that the company
and the shareholder may seek to hold the same party liable for the same
loss. Whilst affirming that double recovery cannot be permitted,
33 Neuberger LJ went further and observed, by way of dicta, that the rule would apply
even to the claim of a creditor simpliciter, ie, one who was not a shareholder. His
Honour stated (Gardner v Parker [2004] 2 BCLC 554 at [71]): "Indeed, it is hard to
see why the rule should not apply to a claim brought by a creditor (or indeed, an
employee) of the company concerned, even if he is not a shareholder ... it is hard
to see any logical or commercial reason why the rule against reflective loss should
apply to a claim brought by a creditor or employee, who happens to be a
shareholder, of the company, if it does not equally apply to an otherwise identical
claim by another creditor or employee, who is not a shareholder in the company."
This view has been criticised: see V Yeo, "Creditors and the Principle of
Reflective Loss" (2007) 19 SAcLJ 385; P W Lee, "Creditors' Claims for Reflective
Loss" [2008] JBL 479.
34 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 62.
35 This is also a rationale for the rule in Foss vHarbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461.
36 Lord Goff stated, in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 195 as
follows: "I for my part cannot see why in principle a party should not assume
responsibility to more than one person in respect of the same activity."
See also P Watts, "The Shareholder as Co-Promisee" (2001) LQR 388
at 390-391; C Mitchell, "Shareholders' Claims for Reflective Loss" (2004) 120 LQR 457
at 464.
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Thomas J proceeded to enunciate the different options that the court
may adopt to deal with the problem of double recovery. On the facts
before him, his Honour was of the view that the problem did not arise
as the company had chosen to settle its claim.3 His Honour observed as
follows:"
No doubt, such a possibility [of double recovery] is most likely with
smaller private companies where the interrelationship between the
company, the directors and the shareholders may give rise to
independent duties on the part of the professional advisers involved.
But the situation where one defendant owes a duty to two persons
who suffer a common loss is not unknown in the law, and it will need
to be examined in this context. It may be found that there is no
necessary reason why the company's loss should take precedence over
the loss of the individuals who are owed a separate duty of care. To
meet the problem of double recovery in such circumstances it will be
necessary to evolve principles to determine which party or parties will
be able to seek or obtain recovery. A stay of one proceeding may be
required. Judgment, with a stay of execution against one or other of
the parties, may be in order. An obligation to account in whole or in
part may be appropriate. The interest of creditors who may benefit if
one party recovers and not the other may require consideration.
14 Clearly then, the English position is driven by more than
concerns with preventing double recovery. Lady Justice Arden, in Day v
Cook,39 expressed the position thus:
It will thus be seen from the speeches in Johnson v Gore Wood that
where there is a breach of duty to both the shareholder and the
company and the loss which the shareholder suffers is merely a
reflection of the company's loss there is now a clear rule that the
shareholder cannot recover. That follows from the graphic example of
the shareholder who is led to part with the key to the company's
money box and the theft of the company's money from that box. It is
not simply the case that double recovery will not be allowed, so that,
for instance if the company's claim is not pursued or there is some
defence to the company's claim, the shareholder can pursue his claim.
The company's claim, if it exists, will always trump that of the
shareholder. Accordingly the court has no discretion. The claim cannot be
entertained. [emphasis added]
37 The professional advisers had accepted a compromise in the knowledge that the
shareholders' claim remained outstanding. Thomas J thought, however, that an
allowance might need to be made for the amount already paid to the liquidator in
settlement of the company's claim: Christensen v Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273 at 280.
But see Lord Millett's view of this in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1
at 66. See also Mitchell's discussion of the point in (2004) 120 LQR 457 at 468ff.
38 Christensen v Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273 at 280.
39 [2001] EWCA Civ 592, [2002] 1 BCLC 1 at [38]-[40].
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15 This brings us to the second of Lord Millett's policy concerns -
that of the need to protect the interests of the company's shareholders
and creditors. From the perspective of the shareholders as a whole,
litigation through the company benefits all shareholders rateably as it
prevents an individual shareholder from recovering at the expense of the
rest. This policy is most compelling where all the shareholders possess
the same rights against the defendant and possess the same opportunity
to recover by means of a corporate claim against the wrongdoer, as was
indeed the case in Prudential Assurance itself. It will be recalled that the
personal cause of action asserted by the plaintiff shareholder in that case
was premised on misleading advice which was given to the shareholders
of Newman in order to secure their approval to a wrongful scheme.
If the defendants were in breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff
shareholder, they would equally have been in breach of the same duties
owed to every other shareholder in the company. The plaintiff
shareholder's personal claim is therefore not unique to that shareholder,
and the policy concern is clearly of relevance on these facts.
16 On the other hand, the need to protect the interests of other
shareholders does not arise where either all the other shareholders are
themselves defendants, or in the case of a company with only one
shareholder. In these situations, the logic of the policy is far from
persuasive.
17 The more important concern then is the need to protect
creditors. Lord Bingham expressed it as follows:40
The court must respect the principle of company autonomy, [and]
ensure that the company's creditors are not prejudiced by the action of
individual shareholders ...
18 The rule ensures that any recovery for wrongs against the
company goes into the company's coffers, so as to ultimately benefit the
company's creditors. The argument is that if the individual shareholder
action was allowed to proceed, this would leave the creditors of the
company without access to the recovered amounts as these inure solely
for the benefit of the shareholder. The pool of corporate assets that
should be available for the satisfaction of creditors' claims is thus, by that
account, reduced. As Millett LJ explained in Stein v Blake:41
If this action were allowed to proceed and the plaintiff were to recover
for the lost value of his shareholding from the first defendant, this
would reduce his ability to meet any judgment which might thereafter
be obtained by the liquidators, or by any of the old companies which
were not in liquidation, to the prejudice of their creditors. The
40 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 36.
41 [1998] 1 All ER 724 at 730.
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plaintiff would have obtained by a judgment of the court the very
same extraction of value from the old companies at the expense of
their creditors that the first defendant is alleged to have obtained by
fraud and deceit.
19 This concern is especially acute where the company is insolvent
or near insolvency. However, even under these circumstances, creditors
are, in any case, only entitled to collect from or claim against assets
which rightfully belong to the company. And the question when this is
the case can only be answered by examining the particular right the
shareholder is asserting against the defendant. Where the cause of action
being pursued rightfully belongs to the shareholder as an individual and
not as a member of a class of shareholders, the argument that the
shareholder's personal right ought to be subordinated so as to protect
the interests of the company's creditors would seem somewhat less
compelling. Ironically, it is the very need to, in Lord Bingham's words,
"respect the principle of company autonomy" that demands the
recognition that shareholders are separate from the company, which
in turn forms the premise upon which rights and obligations of
shareholders are distinguished from those of the corporate entity. If
indeed the right of the shareholder is an independent personal right, the
fact that the loss suffered is reflective of the company's loss should not
lead to a destruction of that right. The critical inquiry, therefore, is the
determination of the nature of the plaintiff shareholder's personal claim
against the defendant. In any case, if the company decides not to
proceed against the defendant, it is this decision that affects the pool of
company assets against which the creditors may enforce their rights.
20 Where the concern, on the other hand, is with the finite ability
of the common defendant to make good his liability to both the
company and the shareholder, this may be adequately dealt with by
focusing on ensuring that there is no double recovery. In recognising
that the shareholder could proceed with his claim for consequential
losses4 against the defendant, the court in Johnson was clearly not
particularly concerned with the defendant's ability to meet other claims
42 In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 36, the House of Lords allowed
Johnson's claim for "enhancement of the value of Mr Johnson's pension if the
payments had been duly made". Lord Millett observed at 67-68 as follows:
"Mr Johnson's claim in respect of the enhancement of his pension is a different
matter. The problem here is one of remoteness of damage, not reflective loss, for
the loss (or strictly the net loss) is one which the company could not have sustained
itself. Had Mr Johnson carried on business in his own name instead of through the
medium of the company, then (subject only to the question of remoteness) he
would have been entitled to recover a sum representing the lost increase in the
value of his pension after giving credit for the amount saved in respect of the
contributions and interest. Such loss is separate and distinct from the loss suffered
by the company...".
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the shareholder may have, which may compete to a similar extent for the
defendant's funds.
21 In the case of a financially healthy and solvent company, the
interests of its creditors are really not under any real threat at all.44 The
risk of non-payment to the creditors is abstract and any fear of adverse
consequences for the company's creditors is merely theoretical.
22 From the above discussion, it is clear that the policy concerns
and grounds that sustain the no reflective loss principle are not always
relevant nor are they incapable of being adequately met by appropriate
orders of court. It is perhaps because of this that the English position
has been described as "drastic".46 At this juncture, it is important to note
that there is at least one situation in which reflective losses, in spite of
their being such, may be recovered by the shareholder. Lord Bingham
described this situation as follows: 4
Where a company suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to
recover that loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of
it (if the shareholder has a cause of action to do so), even though the
loss is a diminution in the value of the shareholding.
23 His Lordship cited, inter alia, Fischer (George) (Great Britain)
Ltd v Multi Construction Ltd, 4 as authority for the proposition. There,
a holding company had contracted with the defendant for the supply
and installation of certain equipment on the premises of its wholly-
owned subsidiaries. The equipment was defective and this resulted in
losses being suffered by the subsidiaries. The holding company was held
entitled to claim damages for what were effectively reflective losses as
the subsidiaries had no claim themselves against the defendant.
24 In the later decision of Giles v Rhind,49 the English Court of
Appeal extended the concession to a situation where the inability of the
company to pursue its cause of action against the defendant was the
result of the very wrong done to the company by the defendant.
Waller LJ stated as follows:?'
One situation which is not addressed is the situation in which the
wrongdoer by the breach of duty owed to the shareholder has actually
43 See P Watts, "The Shareholder as Co-promisee" (2001) 117 LQR 388 at 391.
44 C Mitchell, "Shareholders' Claims for Reflective Loss" (2004) 120 LQR 457
at 464-465.
45 To paraphrase Finkelstein J in Re CSR Ltd (2010) 265 ALR 703 at [88].
46 R P Austin & I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis,
Online Ed) at para 11.237.
47 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 35.
48 [1995] 1 BCLC 260.
49 [2003] Ch 618. See also Perry v Day [2005] 2 BCLC 405.
50 Giles v Rhind [2003] Ch 618 at [34].
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disabled the company from pursuing such cause of action as the
company had. It seems hardly right that the wrongdoer who is in
breach of contract to a shareholder can answer the shareholder by
saying,'The company had a cause of action which it is true I prevented
it from bringing, but that fact alone means that I the wrongdoer do
not have to pay anybody'
25 Although this decision has been applauded as being "policy-
sensitive"' " it has been criticised as wrongly decided by Lord Millett,
sitting as a non-permanent judge in the Court of Final Appeal of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the decision of
Waddington Ltd v Chan.52 Nonetheless, Giles v Rhind was more recently
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Webster v Sandersons Solicitors" in
which Lord Clarke MR observed" that it remained binding unless
overruled by the Supreme Court of the UK.
26 The position in England is therefore relatively clear - the no
reflective loss principle presents a significant hurdle for shareholder
litigation.
III. A limited recovery of reflective loss
27 The Singapore Court of Appeal considered the no reflective loss
principle in Townsing v fenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd" ("fenton").
The facts of ]enton may be briefly stated. The plaintiff and its wholly-
owned subsidiary NQF were part of a group of companies which owed a
sum of money to Normandy. Townsing was a director of both the
plaintiff and NQF, having been appointed to the respective boards as
Normandy's nominee. The plaintiff sued Townsing for breach of
directors' duties in making a payment out of NQF's funds to Normandy.
As Normandy had no legal right to the payment, Townsing was held to
be in breach of his fiduciary duties to both the plaintiff and NQE The
question of the applicability of the no reflective loss principle was raised
as Townsing's impugned act related, not to the plaintiff's assets, but to
the assets of NQF, the misapplication of which resulted in the insolvency
of NQE Although the principle was not pleaded by Townsing, the Court
of Appeal invited counsel for the parties to submit arguments on the
same.
51 C Mitchell, "Shareholders' Claims for Reflective Loss" (2004) 120 LQR 457 at 472.
52 [2008] HKEC 1498, [2009] 2 BCLC 82 at [85]. See also Gardner v Parker [2004]
BCLC 554; Webster v Sandersons Solicitors [2009] 2 BCLC 542.
53 [2009] 2 BCLC 542.
54 Webster v Sandersons Solicitors [2009] 2 BCLC 542 at [36].
55 [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597. See V Yeo, "Creditors and the Principle of Reflective Loss"
(2007) 19 SAcLJ 385; P W Lee, "Creditors' Claims for Reflective Loss" [2008]
JBL 479.
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28 Against this background, the court held that the plaintiff's
losses, manifested in its inability to recover its loan from NQF and in the
reduction in value of its shareholding in NQF, were clearly reflective of
NQF's losses. Hence, if the no reflective loss principle had been raised
at trial, it would have precluded the plaintiff's claims.56 The court
considered the divergent approaches adopted in Christensen v Scott and
in Johnson, and expressly preferred the English approach.5' However, the
court accepted that had the principle been pleaded at trial, the plaintiff
could have had the opportunity to adduce evidence or to take steps to
disapply the no reflective loss principle.) The Chief Justice observed as
follows:60
We may reasonably assume that Jenton would have been able to
procure NQF to give an undertaking to the court not to sue the
appellant in order to continue with its claim against the appellant
since NQF was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Jenton. Also, NQF had
no creditor other then Jenton ... Such an undertaking would have
disapplied the principle of reflective loss as there would be no
possibility of double recovery.
29 This, of course, differs markedly from the English approach
which, as we have seen, insists on an absolute approach - a company's
claim, if it exists, will always trump that of the shareholders.6 1
30 Jenton is not the first local case in which the issue of recovery of
reflective loss was considered. In the earlier decision of Hengwell
Development Pte Ltd v Thing Chiang Ching,6 the Singapore High Court
similarly eschewed absolutism. The plaintiff in that case was a 51%
shareholder in a joint venture company ("JVC"), the only other
shareholder being FEP. JVC's sole business activity was through its
wholly-owned Chinese subsidiary, QZH. By the joint venture agreement,
the running of QZH was left in the hands of executives appointed by
FEP. A dispute arose between the joint venture partners, with the
plaintiff alleging that the executives of QZH appointed by FEP had
breached their fiduciary duties to QZH. The plaintiff applied under
56 Townsing vJenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [74].
57 In Christensen v Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273, the New Zealand Court of Appeal placed
emphasis on the fact that a separate duty was owed by the defendants to the
shareholders (at 280). In contrast, the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood &
Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 66, focused on the loss which the shareholder is claiming. If
this loss is merely reflective of the company's loss, the shareholder cannot recover
that loss against the defendant, notwithstanding a separate duty or obligation owed
by the defendant to the shareholder.
58 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [77].
59 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [85].
60 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [85 ]-[86].
61 Day v Cook [2001] EWCA Civ 592, [2002] 1 BCLC 1 at [40], per Lady Justice Arden.
62 [2002] 2 SLR(R) 454.
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s 216A of the Singapore Companies Act63 seeking the court's leave to
commence legal action against the executives in the name of and on
behalf of JVC. The executives raised the no reflective loss principle,
contending that the alleged losses suffered by JVC, being effectively the
diminution in the value of its shareholding in QZH, were merely
reflective of QZH's losses. Evidence was adduced that Chinese company
law did not provide for a statutory derivative action similar to
Singapore's s 216A, and in a situation such as the present where the
shareholders were deadlocked, the company would be unable to enforce
its rights against any alleged wrongdoers.
31 Lai Kew Chai J considered that, as the company, QZH, was
unable to prosecute its claims against the errant executives, the case
fell within Lord Bingham's second proposition.6 4 Accordingly, the
application should therefore be allowed so that the shareholder, JVC,
could bring an action to recover its losses, notwithstanding that these
were reflective losses. Lai J stated:6
A litigant is not to be lightly turned away from bringing a genuine
cause before our courts. A fortiori, if there is no risk of double recovery
and there is no prejudice to the creditors or shareholders of the
company, which has no remedy in any event under Chinese law, the
policy reasons behind the decision in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co do
not apply.
32 The Singapore courts are not alone in recognising the
shareholder's personal claim for reflective losses. This is the position in
New Zealand too, where the governing principles were established in the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Christensen v Scott. In that case,
the only shareholders of a company were allowed to claim against
professional advisers, who were also advisers to the company, for
damages representing the reduction in value of their shareholding
arising from breach of duties owed to them personally. In the court's
view, the fact that the company itself had suffered loss as a result of a
breach of duty owed to the company by the defendants did not
necessarily exclude the claim of a party who also happened to be a
member of the company. As Thomas J explained: 66
Where such a party, irrespective that he or she is a member, has
personal rights and these rights are invaded, the rule in Foss v
Harbottle is irrelevant ... The loss arises not from a breach of the duty
owed to the company but from a breach of duty owed to the
63 Cap 50, 1994 Rev Ed.
64 It is not clear from the facts whether QZH had no cause of action under Chinese
law, or whether in fact it did have a cause of action but that there was no person
with the necessary authority to prosecute it.
65 Hengwell Development Pte Ltd v Thing Chiang Ching [2002] 2 SLR(R) 454 at [22].
66 Christensen v Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273 at 280.
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individuals. The individuals [sic] is simply suing to vindicate his own
right or redress a wrong done to him or her giving rise to a personal
loss.
33 In the US, a version of the English rule in Foss v Harbottle
applies. Thus, where a shareholder suffers a fall in the value of his shares
as a result of a wrong to the company, the "non-conductor principle"
applies to preclude the shareholder from bringing a personal claim,
insisting instead on the action being brought derivatively. Similar
reasons justify this course. In Durham v Durham," for example, the New
Hampshire court stated:
Courts generally require a shareholder to bring a derivative, as
opposed to a direct, suit against corporate officers to redress injuries to
the corporation because the derivative proceeding:
(1) prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by shareholders;
(2) protects corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of the
recovery back in the corporation;
(3) protects the interests of all shareholders by increasing the
value of their shares, instead of allowing a recovery by one
shareholder to prejudice the rights of others not a party to
the suit; and
(4) adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing
the value of his shares.
34 However, where the shareholder is able to establish the
infringement of a direct personal right, he is generally entitled to pursue
a direct action for personal recovery. The difficult issues that arise in
distinguishing between individual and derivative actions occur in cases
where the shareholder does not have an obvious independent personal
claim. Even in such cases, the courts have allowed personal recovery if
the action may be classified as a direct, as opposed to a derivative, one.69
Different tests exist to determine whether a shareholder may sue
directly, and there appears to be no single approach that has been
67 Donnell v Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co 208 US 267 (1908) at 273.
68 871 A 2d 41 (NH 2005) at 45.
69 Contrast Lord Bingham's second proposition in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002]
2 AC 1 at 35: "Where a company suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to
recover that loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it (if the
shareholder has a cause of action to do so), even though the loss is a diminution in
the value of the shareholding." [emphasis added] See also Ellis v Property Leeds
(UK) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 32, [2002] 2 BCLC 175 where Mantell LJ reiterated the
need for the plaintiff shareholders to have an independent cause of action against
the defendant: at [11].
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universally adopted across the different states.7' Additionally, the
American Law Institute has proposed a special rule that applies to
closely held corporations. A closely held corporation is essentially one
with few shareholders, all or a majority of whom participate in the
management of the corporation, and whose shares are not freely
transferable.71 This rule allows the court discretion to treat an action
raising derivative claims as a direct action. It states as follows:72
In the case of a closely-held corporation, the court in its discretion
may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt
it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative
actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that to do so
will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of
creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of
the recovery among all interested persons.
35 Some states have adopted this rule as law." This lack of
consensus notwithstanding, what is clear about the position in the US is
that the fact that the loss suffered by the shareholder is reflective of the
company's loss would not, of and by itself, preclude a direct action by
the shareholder.
IV. The corporate/personal distinction
36 It will be recalled that in ]enton, the company had only one
shareholder, as it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the plaintiff, and
further that the company had no creditor apart from the plaintiff. Given
70 See generally E J Thompson, "Direct Harm, Special Injury, or Duty Owed: Which
Test Allows for the Most Shareholder Success in Direct Shareholder Litigation?"
(2009-2010) 35 Journal of Corporation Law 215.
71 See generally B Gitlin, Annotation, "When is Corporation Close, or Closely-Held,
Corporation under Common or Statutory Law" (2004) 111 American Law Reports
5th 207. This is similar to the concept of the quasi-partnership under English
and Singapore law. In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360,
Lord Wilberforce listed (at 380) the following characteristics of a quasi-partnership:
"(i) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship,
involving mutual confidence - this element will often be found where a pre-existing
partnership has been converted into a limited company; (ii) an agreement, or
understanding, that all, or some (for there may be 'sleeping' members), of the
shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business; (iii) restriction upon
the transfer of the members' interest in the company - so that if confidence is
lost, or one member is removed from management, he cannot take out his stake
and go elsewhere." See also Chua Kien How v Goodwealth Trading Pte Ltd [ 1992]
1 SLR(R) 870.
72 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations (1994) para 7.01(d). Lady Justice Arden made reference to this
rule in Day v Cook [2001] EWCA Civ 592, [2002] 1 BCLC 1 at [40].
73 See generally D S Kleinberger, "Direct versus Derivative and the Law of Limited
Liability Companies" (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 63.
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these specific circumstances, the court concluded that there was "no
principle of law that would have prevented the court from accepting
[the undertaking] since it would ensure that there would be no double
recovery or prejudice to other shareholders or creditors in allowing
Jenton to proceed with its claim". 74 In a factual situation such as that
presented in ]enton, it is arguably of little practical import whether the
suit proceeds at the instance of the sole shareholder or of the company.
In such companies, the injury suffered by the company is practically
indistinct from the injury suffered by its sole shareholder, and it would
therefore be artificial, particularly in the absence of any external creditor
interests, to insist that any remedial action be taken through the
company. The focus of the court was, therefore, on ensuring there was
no double recovery.
37 However, it should be appreciated that, when seizing upon the
fact that the company in question was wholly owned, the fact that it was
nonetheless a separate legal entity, with its own rights and obligations,
may be readily obscured. The Saloman 6 principle, that an incorporated
company has a separate legal existence of its own, is a fundamental tenet
of company law. The fact that a company is wholly owned by a single
shareholder does not change this fact. Accordingly, even as our courts
are prepared to adopt a pragmatic approach in the area of individual
recovery for reflective losses, respect for corporate autonomy dictates
that individual recovery should only be allowed where the right asserted
by the plaintiff is indeed an independent legal right that the plaintiff is
entitled to assert. This is arguably especially so where the company is
wholly owned or substantially wholly owned, for an independent legal
right does not vest in the controlling shareholder by that fact alone. The
English decision of Ellis v Property Leeds (UK) Ltd 7 usefully illustrates
the point.
38 The plaintiffs were directors of a small group of companies
known as the Cross Lane Group, the shares of which were either held by
the plaintiffs themselves or on trust for them. They were presented with
an opportunity to purchase for development a substantial building site
74 Townsing vJenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [85].
75 See also the earlier Singapore High Court decision in Hengwell Development Pte Ltd v
Thing Chiang Ching [2002] 2 SLR(R) 454.
76 See Saloman vA Saloman and Co Ltd [ 1897] 1 AC 22.
77 See Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 at 536 where Slade LJ stated as
follows: "Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary
companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will
nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all
the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities."
The position is the same in Singapore: see, inter alia, Win Line (UK) Ltd v
Masterpart (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 24 and The "Andres Bonifacio"
[1993] 3 SLR(R) 71.
78 [2002] EWCA Civ 32, [2002] 2 BCLC 175.
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which was being sold by the receivers of a failed housing association. To
that end, they commissioned and relied on a valuation from the
defendant surveyors in making the purchase, which was made through
one of the companies in the group. The valuation was grossly
inaccurate, and the venture failed, resulting in the collapse of several
companies within the group. The plaintiffs claimed personally against
the defendant alleging negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation in the
valuation, seeking compensation for, inter alia, the destruction of the
value of their shares in the companies. The claim was dismissed on the
basis of the no reflective loss principle. The court concluded that the
valuation was addressed to the companies, who would therefore be the
rightful parties to rely on the same. The plaintiffs had acted on the
valuation as directors of the companies. At trial, Rougier J made the
following observations:79
[The valuation] was sent to Mr Ellis as director of the various
companies within the group, and insofar as he or Mr Clayton took
action in reliance on that valuation, they did so as directors of the
various companies who became embroiled to their disadvantage. I do
not think it can be sensibly argued in any other way.
39 As the defendant had dealt with the plaintiffs as representatives
of the companies, the plaintiffs had no right to recover the reflective
losses despite being practically the sole shareholders of the companies.
The victims of any misrepresentation contained in the valuation were
the companies, in which companies the cause of action against the
defendant necessarily vested.
40 The case of Johnson may be similarly analysed. It will be recalled
that Johnson conducted his various businesses through a number of
wholly-owned or substantially wholly-owned companies. He carried on
the business of property development through WWH Ltd, in which he
held all but two of the issued shares, and was also its managing director.
As Lord Bingham put it, WWH Ltd was the "corporate embodiment"0
of Johnson. The defendant was a firm of solicitors which acted, on
occasion, for Johnson personally. In this instance, however, the
defendant had been instructed by Johnson, in his capacity as managing
director of WWH Ltd," in connection with a proposed purchase of land
for development. As a result of the firm's negligence in connection with
the exercise of the option for the purchase, which was held by WWH
Ltd, WWH Ltd was embroiled in protracted litigation. By the time this
was concluded, the property market had collapsed, which in combination
with all the other events kick-started by the defendant's negligence,
79 Ellis v Property Leeds (UK) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 32, [2002] 2 BCLC 175 at [12].
The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge's observations.
80 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 17.
81 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 17.
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resulted in WWH Ltd suffering substantial loss. The partners of the firm
settled the company's claim for breach of duty. Johnson then claimed
against the defendant for breach of a separate duty owed to him
personally, for, inter alia, the diminution in value of his pension and
majority shareholding in WWH Ltd. The House of Lords struck out
these claims as the losses were reflective of the WVWH Ltd's loss.
41 The case had proceeded on the basis that the firm owed
Johnson an independent duty in respect of this loss. However, it was, as
Waller LJ observed in Giles v Rhind,8 2 not entirely obvious that such an
independent duty in fact existed. Indeed, at least in respect of the
particular complaint of professional negligence raised, the contrary
could very well be true, for it was reasonably clear that Johnson had
dealt with the defendant firm as the representative of and on the
company's behalf in respect of the subject matter of the complaint. The
negligence, if any, would have been in connection with the firm's
obligation to the company. Under such circumstances, the wrong alleged
must be fundamentally corporate. Johnson was therefore rightly
precluded from recovering the reflective losses suffered. Additionally, the
settlement agreement between WWH Ltd and the firm had been agreed
to by Johnson on the company's behalf. As Lord Millett pointed out,
"Johnson cannot be permitted to challenge in one capacity the adequacy
of the terms he agreed in another".3
42 The distinction between corporate rights and individual rights
is complicated by the unique84 position in which a shareholder stands
vis-a-vis his company. Part of the difficulty lies in the manner in which
companies operate in general. It is trite that a company necessarily acts
through its constitutional organs and through individuals as its agents.
A shareholder is a constituent member of the general meeting, and
when he is acting as such a constituent member, his individual act, taken
together with the acts of the rest of the general meeting, transmutates
into an act of the company. An apparently separate shareholder right
that arises under these circumstances, therefore, is really not separate at
all, but is, to use Chan CJ's phrase, a consequence of the artificial
construct created by the company's separate legal personality.'
43 The facts of Prudential Assurance is illustrative. It will be recalled
that the personal claim was premised on certain misrepresentations
82 [2003] 1 Ch 618 at [28].
83 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 66.
84 Townsing v fenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [77],
per Chan CJ.
85 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 597 at [77]. Chan CJ
had observed that the apparent separability of a shareholder's loss and his
company's loss is a consequence of the artificial construct created by the company's
separate legal persona.
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made by the defendants to the plaintiff, not in its separate capacity as an
investor, but in its capacity as a member of the general meeting for
the purpose of securing general meeting approval for the company's
purchase of certain assets at an overvalue. The misrepresentation was
therefore essentially addressed to the company, and received in this
instance by the company in general meeting. The plaintiff's right, if it
existed, was therefore not a separate and independent personal right.
44 Personal rights often arise out of contracts, and where the
shareholder has an independent contractual right against the defendant
vis-a-vis the subject matter of the suit, there should be little objection to
allowing personal recovery provided concerns over double recovery and
creditor interests are addressed. Where, however, the contract is one to
which the company is also party, such as a shareholders' agreement, it
becomes necessary to examine the contract in question in order to
determine if the shareholder should indeed be accorded a direct claim
with respect to the reflective losses. This, in essence, is an attempt to
distinguish between corporate rights and personal rights. Although the
distinction can be difficult to draw, it is not an exercise that is unknown
in company law. As is well known, identical allegations of fact are capable
of supporting both a personal complaint in respect of the statutory
action for oppression or unfair prejudice," as well as a corporate action,
whether brought derivatively or otherwise. In Re Charnley Davies Ltd
(No 2)," Millett J (as Lord Millett then was) considered the overlap
between the personal and corporate actions and opined that the
distinction does not lie in the particular acts or omissions of which
complaint is made, but in the nature of the complaint and the remedy
necessary to meet it. The question was what "the whole gist"" of the
complaint was.
45 In a similar manner, in considering whether to allow the
shareholder to proceed personally to recover what are effectively
reflective losses, the court should consider the nature of the complaint.
If the particular wrong alleged is primarily the result of a breach of duty
or an infringement of a right that runs directly to the company, then the
shareholder should not be entitled to recover in a personal action
reflective losses, even if the policy concerns do not obtain. On the other
hand, if the action is premised on a primary or personal right that
belongs directly to the shareholder, then he should be entitled to
maintain an action in his own right, provided the policy concerns may
86 See Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 216; Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK)
s 994; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Australia) s 232; Companies Ordinance
(Cap 32) (Hong Kong) s 168A.
87 [1990] BCLC 760. See also Re Chime Corp Ltd (2004) 7 HKCFAR 546 and
Waddington Ltd v Chan [2008] HKEC 1498; [2009] 2 BCLC 82.
88 Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No 2) [1990] BCLC 760 at 783.
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be adequately addressed. This exercise requires an analysis of the nature
of the particular right the shareholder is asserting. Consider the facts of
Giles v Rhind."
46 Giles and the defendant Rhind were directors and the founding
shareholders of SHF, each then holding approximately 50% of the issued
shares. The company was successful and Apax, a venture capital firm,
invested E1.285m in the company in exchange for shares and loan
stocks. The shareholding of Giles and Rhind were correspondingly
reduced. Giles was appointed managing director of SHF, while Rhind
was appointed the commercial director. The terms of Apax's investment
in SHF were enshrined in a subscription and shareholders' agreement
between all the parties, including SHF. It was a term of the agreement
that each of the parties agreed to "keep secret and confidential and not
to use disclose or divulge to any third party or to enable or cause any
person to become aware of (except for the purposes of the company's
business) any confidential information relating to the company". The
agreement also restricted Giles and Rhind from being involved in other
businesses after cessation of their employment by SHF. These latter
restrictions were expressed to be for the specified purpose of protecting
Apax's investment in the business. Matching provisions in substantially
similar terms were contained in the service agreements entered into by
Giles and Rhind with SHF. Subsequently, the relationship between
Giles and Rhind broke down and after Rhind's resignation, he diverted
the company's most lucrative contract to his own company using
confidential information in relation to SHF in breach of the covenant in
the shareholders' agreement. SHF brought an action against Rhind, but,
after going into administrative receivership, was unable to put up
security for Rhind's costs and consequently had to discontinue the
action. Giles then brought a personal action against Rhind, claiming
damages for the loss of value of his shares in the company as well as for
loss of remuneration he would otherwise have earned.
47 Although Giles was a party to the contract, a closer look at the
agreement will suggest that the particular covenant was not, contrary to
his allegations, intended to protect his investment in SHF. The covenant
imposed the no-disclosure obligation in respect of confidential
information relating to the company not only on Rhind, but also on
Giles himself. Any disclosure must be for the purposes of the company.
Read in context, therefore, it seems reasonably clear that the no-
disclosure obligation was intended to protect the company and its
business. Any protection accorded by the covenant over the investment
interests of the shareholders must necessarily be indirect and wrought
through the company. This particular wrong, and hence the complaint,
was therefore more likely to be primarily corporate. Seen from this
89 [2003] Ch 618.
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perspective, the decision to allow Giles to bring a personal claim may,
with respect, have been incorrect,
48 On the other hand, how the court should deal with a breach of
the post-employment restrictions imposed on Rhind and Giles may well
be different. These restrictions were, by the terms of the shareholders'
agreement, expressed as being intended to protect Apax's investment. It
is not clear from the facts whether Rhind's acts would have been in
breach of these restrictions. If so, Apax could arguably have had an
independent personal right to enforce the covenant. If Apax had
pursued the action, it should, it is submitted, be entitled to recovery of
reflective losses subject to the policy concerns being adequately
addressed.
49 Apart from contract, personal rights may also arise out of duties
that are imposed by law. Gardner v Parker" involved precisely such a
right, a right which arose out of a breach of the director's fiduciary duty
to avoid a conflict of interests. The plaintiff was beneficially entitled to
15% of the shares in the company BDC, while the defendant held the
remaining 85%. BDC's two largest assets were 9% of the issued share
capital of S Ltd and a debt of E799,000 owed to it by S Ltd. The
defendant, who was essentially the sole director of both BDC and S Ltd,
owned the remaining 91% of S Ltd's issued shares. The defendant
procured the transfer, at a substantial undervalue, by S Ltd, of an asset it
owned to a company which the defendant controlled. BDC subsequently
went into liquidation and its liquidator assigned to the plaintiff the
benefit of BDC's rights of action in respect of its 9% shareholding in
S Ltd and the £799,000 debt. The plaintiff then brought proceedings
against the defendant for breach of director's duties to BDC, seeking to
recover the loss that BDC had suffered as a result of the transfer.
Although the defendant's wrongful act was in connection with an asset
of S Ltd, the trial judge, Blackburn J,91 eschewed too narrow an approach
in connection with the defendant's duties as a director of BDC. His
Honour stated:9
At the time of the transfer Mr Parker was also a director of BDC.
Knowing, as a director of BDC with a duty to safeguard BDC's assets,
including in particular its 9% shareholding in [S Ltd] and its E799,000
debt, that the transfer would impact adversely upon [S Ltd's] value
and, therefore, upon BDC's 9% shareholding in [S Ltd] and the
recoverability of the E799,000 debt ..., Mr Parker could not,
consistently with his duties to BDC, simply sit back and do nothing in
the face of the impending transfer. In respect of the transfer he was as
much in a position of conflict as a director of BDC (as between his
90 [2004] 2 BCLC 554.
91 Gardner v Parker [2004] 1 BCLC 417.
92 Gardner v Parker [2004] 1 BCLC 417 at [17] and [20].
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duty to that company and his personal interest through Bweralley as
the proposed transferee of the shares) as he was as a director of S Ltd ...
I am satisfied therefore that, on the assumed facts, Mr Parker as a
director of BDC was in breach of the pleaded fiduciary duties which
he owed to BDC. 3
50 However, this direct personal right notwithstanding, the rigid
no reflective loss principle as established in Johnson precluded the
plaintiff's claim. On appeal, counsel for the plaintiff had questioned the
justice of applying the principle on the facts of the present case, but as
Neuberger LJ observed:9 4
That challenge, it seems to me, is not consistent with the principle
established in Johnson's case, and perhaps most clearly expressed by
Lord Millett ... The approach suggested by Mr Steinfeld (counsel for
the plaintiff) appears to me to be more consistent with that of
Thomas I in Christensen v Scott ... discussed in Johnson's case ... with
disapproval by Lord Millett, and, indeed, discussed by Lord Cooke of
Thorndon ... As with many points relating to reflective loss,
Mr Steinfeld's arguments in this connection appear to me to be not
without force, although not without difficulties either. However, in
light of the decision and reasoning in Johnson's case, as subsequently
applied in this court, those arguments could only be determined in the
House of Lords, and then only if it was appropriate for their Lordships
to reconsider the rule against reflective loss.
51 This conclusion may be contrasted with the stance taken by the
Singapore Court of Appeal in ]enton, which, as we saw earlier, involved a
similar situation. In Singapore, the duty to act bona fide in the
company's interests is imposed statutorily by s 157 of the Companies
Act.9 As a director of Jenton, Townsing owed Jenton the duty to act
honestly in connection with his performance of his functions as such a
director. The Court of Appeal considered that the fact that Townsing's
wrongful act was in connection with an asset of the subsidiary did not
alter the fact that his acts also harmed the holding company, Jenton.
Chan CJ observed that courts have generally refused an inflexible
93 The Court of Appeal agreed with this finding: Gardner v Parker [2004] 2 BCLC 554
at [19].
94 Gardner v Parker [2004] 2 BCLC 554 at [75] (references omitted).
95 Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 157(1) provides as follows: "A director
shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the
duties of his office." The local courts have interpreted the requirement to "act
honestly" as a statutory mirror of the fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the interests
of the company at general law: see Cheam Tat Pang v PP [1996] 1 SLR(R) 161
at [19]; Lim Weng Kee v PP [2002] 2 SLR(R) 848 at [32]; Vita Health Laboratories
Pte Ltd v Pang Seng Meng [2004] 4 SLR(R) 162 at [ 14]; Townsing v fenton Overseas
Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [59].
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compartmentalisation of the director's acts,96 which could indeed allow
an errant director to escape liability. The court thus found, consistently
with the position taken in Gardner v Parker, that Townsing's conduct, in
paying the funds of the subsidiary NQF to his appointor Normandy, was
in breach of the duties he owed to fenton. This right that Jenton had
against Townsing was therefore a direct personal right. The court was,
with respect, absolutely correct to allow the recovery of reflective losses
subject to there being no double recovery and no intervention of
creditors' rights.
52 The statutory right conferred on shareholders to petition for an
order to remedy oppression" or unfair prejudice" in the conduct of the
company's affairs is clearly a personal claim. Whilst not all complaints of
oppression will involve wrongs against the company, it is not
uncommon to find a petition founded upon facts which also disclose a
concurrent wrong against the company, usually a breach of directors'
duties.99 Indeed, these "corporate" wrongs provide the very means by
which the oppression is inflicted by the majority on the complaining
shareholders. Given overlapping claims, therefore, is the no reflective
loss principle relevant to oppression petitions? The statutory provision
confers a wide jurisdiction on the court to "make such order as it thinks
fit". As orders are made with a view to "remedying the matters
complained of","'o it is not inconceivable that some element of reflective
loss might have been, by the order, addressed. Where a buyout order is
made, for example, the court has a "very""o wide discretion in valuing
the shares so as to effect justice in the particular circumstances of the
case.10 Thus, as the Singapore Court of Appeal has noted, "the court has
the discretion to enhance the share value in a minority oppression
96 Townsing v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 at [61]-[62].
See also Re Dominion International Group plc (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 572; Gardner v
Parker [2004] 1 BCLC 417; affirmed [2004] 2 BCLC 554.
97 Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 216.
98 Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK) s 994.
99 See, eg, Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon Pte Ltd [1995] 2 SLR(R) 304; Lim Swee
Khiang v Borden Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 745; Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [ 1994]
2 BCLC 354; Re Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 420; Clark v
Cutland [2004] 1 WLR 783. See also H C Hirt, "In What Circumstances Should
Breaches of Directors' Duties Give Rise to a Remedy Under ss 459-461 of the
Companies Act 1985?" (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 100; S Griffin, "Shareholder
Remedies and the No Reflective Loss Principle - Problems Surrounding the
Identification of a Membership Interest" [2010] JBL 461 at 470-471.
100 Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 216(2). The phrase used in the UK is
"giving relief in respect of the matters companies of": Companies Act 2006 (c 46)
(UK) s 996(1).
101 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1985] BCLC 493 at 669, per Oliver LJ.
102 Yeo Hung Khiang v Dickson Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd [ 1999] 1 SLR(R) 773
at [71].
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case".*os Where the value of the shares is adjusted to take account of
the wrongful acts,104 the petitioning shareholder would have effectively
recovered a sum that is reflective of the corporate loss."o The issue was
raised and considered in Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd.106
53 The issued capital of the company comprised A and B shares.
The petitioners were interested in a majority of the B shares, whilst
the respondents were interested in a majority of the A shares. The
petitioners brought an unfair prejudice action on the basis that the
respondents, in breach of an investment agreement between them, had
caused the company to enter into a loan agreement with an
A shareholder on terms which placed the company in a financially
precarious position. This ultimately resulted in the business of the
company being sold to a company controlled by the A shareholders,
depriving the B shareholders of their financial stake in the company.
The relief sought by the petitioners included an order that the
A shareholders and their nominee directors pay "damages""' to the
petitioners. The respondents applied to strike out the petition on the
ground, inter alia, that as the claim for monetary compensation was
based on the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the nominee
directors, the proper claimant should be the company. Any diminution
in the value of the petitioners' shares as a result of the breaches was
purely reflective of the company's loss. Mr Jonathan Crow, sitting as a
deputy judge of the High Court, held that the petition could not be
struck out on this basis, and opined as follows:10
It would ... fly in the face of common sense to suggest that the court,
in exercising its discretion under s 459,"" would necessarily decline
any relief in such a case, and would require the minority shareholders
instead to bring a derivative action, seeking payment to be made to the
company in respect of the entire loss it had suffered: by that route, the
defendant transferees would be having to make a payment to the
transferor company, the bulk of which they would then recover in
their capacity as majority shareholders. That hardly seems like a
desirable route for compensating those who have in fact suffered the
103 Yeo Hung Khiang v Dickson Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd [ 1999] 1 SLR(R) 773
at [71].
104 As in Lim Swee Khiang v Borden Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 745 at [92].
105 See generally J Payne, "Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future
of Shareholder Protection" (2005) 64 CLJ 647 at 670 and 673.
106 [2004] 2 BCLC 191.
107 The judge, Mr Jonathan Crow, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, did not
doubt that the court had jurisdiction to make a compensatory award to the
petitioner under Companies Act 1985 (c 6) (UK) s 459, but observed (Atlasview Ltd v
Brightview Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 191 at [55]) that the term "damages" may not be the
best label for such an award as "that word connotes the financial award a court
makes pursuant to a common law cause of action in tort or contract".
108 Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 191 at [62]-[63].
109 This is the predecessor to Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK) s 994.
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loss. For these reasons, the'reflective loss argument' does not provide a
bar to any of the relief sought in the petition. The fact that the
impugned conduct might give rise to a cause of action at the suit of
the company does not mean that it is incapable also of giving rise to
unfair prejudice.
54 The correctness of the deputy judge's holding was considered
"highly questionable" by Lord Scott, sitting as a non-permanent judge in
the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Administrative Region in
the decision of Re Chime Corp Ltd."o His Lordship opined:
An order for payment or transfer of a part of the company's assets to
the petitioning shareholders is, I would think, an order that could only
properly be made in a winding-up of the company, or as a distribution
of the company's profits, or as part of a reduction of the company's
capital ... Otherwise the interests of the company's creditors would be
at risk.
55 With respect, such a rigid application of the no reflective loss
principle to the oppression remedy will, as the deputy judge pointed
out,11 denude the statutory remedy of much of its intended purpose and
utility. As pointed out earlier, majority shareholders who abuse their
power and position in a company often do so through acts that will
almost always also involve wrongs to the company. Where, as is often the
case, the companies involved in such cases are quasi-partnerships, and
the impugned acts, whether of mismanagement or misuse of corporate
resources, benefitted the very wrongdoers themselves, it would quite
literally "fly in the face of common sense" to dictate that any action in
respect of these wrongs must be mediated through the company.
56 However, if following ]enton, discretion is retained by the
Singapore court to allow recovery notwithstanding an element of
reflective loss being present in the remedy sought, the court could
address the concerns of double recovery and creditor protection by
adjusting the order appropriately. On this point, Deputy Judge Crow
made the following observations in Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd:114
In deciding on the appropriate form of relief, the trial judge will no
doubt be astute to ensure that the B shareholders do not achieve
double recovery by receiving financial compensation directly from the
A shareholders and also retaining their B shares in Brightview in
circumstances where the company is able (if it is) to recover in respect
of the same loss: indeed, it seems to me most likely that the trial judge
would, if the petition succeeded, order the respondents to acquire the
110 [2004] 3 HKLRD 922 at [46].
111 Re Chime Corp Ltd [2004] 3 HKLRD 922 at [46].
112 Atlasview Ltd vBrightview Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 191 at [61].
113 See n 71 above.
114 [2004] 2 BCLC 191 at [63].
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[petitioners'] shares, valued on the basis that there had been no
transfer to Freshbox, rather than making an award of damages
(however described). But that is a matter for his discretion, if and
when it comes to considering the appropriate form of relief. It is not a
ground for summarily striking out the petition, or any particular head
of relief currently pleaded in it.
57 Such an approach would, it is submitted, maintain consistency
in the application of policies across shareholder actions generally.11i It
should also be noted that s 216 provides specifically for the court, by its
order, to "authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name of or on
behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as
the Court may direct".16 Thus, if the complaint is, on final analysis,
primarily corporate, justice to all affected may be better served by
litigating through the company by means of a derivative action.
V. Conclusion
58 Undoubtedly, the no reflective loss principle, as laid down in
Prudential Assurance and as clarified in Johnson, is driven by sound
policy reasons. However, these policy reasons are not always applicable
nor are they in themselves unassailable. As the task of any court should
be to achieve justice and fairness on the particular facts before it, there
is much to be said for retaining discretion over whether to allow a
personal suit or not. Justice is necessarily context-driven. To apply a
rigid rule regardless of context, therefore, raises the real risk of denying
the wronged party appropriate remedy. Whilst consistency and
predictability are important in law, pursuing these should not be at the
expense of justice. As Lai Kew Chai J stated in Hengwell Development Pte
Ltd v Thing Chiang Ching:"
A litigant is not to be lightly turned away from bringing a genuine
cause before our courts. [emphasis added]
59 However, to ensure that the cause brought by a shareholder is
indeed genuine, the asserted claim must, in the first place, be one that
can properly be classified as a personal one, taking account of the source
115 See also S Griffin, "Shareholder Remedies and the No Reflective Loss Principle -
Problems Surrounding the Identification of a Membership Interest" [2010]
JBL 461 at 468 where the observation was made that the oppression remedy, being
a statutory provision, is not subject to the constraints of the common law. This
notwithstanding, in the interests of consistency of policies, the court could, in
exercising its discretion to order an appropriate remedy, take account of the policy
concerns raised by the no reflective loss principle. See also B Hannigan, "Drawing
Boundaries between Derivative Claims and Unfairly Prejudicial Petitions" [2009]
JBL 606.
116 Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 216(2)(c).
117 [2002] 2 SLR(R) 454.
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and nature the right asserted. Only then should the court entertain the
shareholder's claim and proceed to consider whether the policy
concerns that support the rule may be adequately dealt with in the
particular case.
